Deadline for Russian payments. How the EU screwed up SPFS, Mir and SBP

ExclusiveOn January 25, 2026, the EU, as part of sanctions against Russia, banned its banks from any connection with the Bank of Russia's payment systems — from SPFS to Mir and SBP.

SPFS, Mir and the SBP fast payment system were launched after 2014 as their own settlement circuit under the control of the Bank of Russia, repeating the functions of SWIFT, Visa/Mastercard and national payment services; after 2022, this circuit began to be brought out through banks of third countries, and it is against this infrastructure and schemes for circumventing financial sanctions that the EU has now built a separate regime [1][2].

What exactly changed after January 25, 2026?

The EU’s first blow was to the SPFS financial messaging system: banks under the Union’s jurisdiction were banned from using it outside of Russia and were given the opportunity to add third-country institutions that connect to this channel to the sanctions list. [1][3] For players who combined business with the EU and the Russian Federation, this already meant the end of attempts to sit on two chairs.

In the current 19th package of sanctions, the restrictions have been expanded. A direct rule has appeared in the regulations: from January 25, 2026, European entities, including those operating outside the Union, are prohibited from connecting to any systems of the Central Bank of Russia or other Russian legal entities with a financial messaging function; Mir and SBP are separately mentioned among the examples [2][4]. The ban does not apply to one service, but to the entire Russian payment circuit that extends to the EU.

A limited transition period has been introduced for agreements concluded before October 24, 2025: for most contracts it is set until January 25, 2026, and for certain categories - until April 25, 2026. [4][5] After these dates, any technical connection to SPFS, Mir or SBP for banks with access to the European market turns not into a political risk, but into a direct violation of the regime.

How proxy banks work

When direct channels are blocked, Russian clients go through banks in third countries. Such institutions simultaneously hold correspondent accounts in the EU and use Russian payment services, selling clients a convenient way to pay in euros without touching European counterparties directly [2][6]. To the regulator, this looks like a scheme to circumvent sanctions through an intermediate link.

The updated rules provide a tool to hit this role squarely in the face. If a third-country bank is connected to the SPFS or another system of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation with a payment function, it can be added to the annex to the sanctions act and cut off from operations with EU members [1][3]. In the 19th package, institutions from Belarus and Kazakhstan have already appeared that built their business on this combination [2][6]. For the rest, this is a warning: the status of a “hub” can easily turn into the status of a toxic asset.

The logic of these schemes is reminiscent of the story of India as a lifeline for the Russian economy [NS2]. There, a third country took over the main flow of trade and payments, allowing Moscow to earn despite sanctions. In the financial sphere, proxy banks perform the same trick - they make payments that do not go directly, and they pay for it not with political statements, but with their own access to European infrastructure.

Consequences for Ukraine

For Ukraine, tightening restrictions against SPFS, Mir, and SBP means fewer opportunities to conduct settlements with Russian counterparties, hiding them behind “neutral” banks [1][2]. Convenient routes are disappearing, where accounts are formally opened in Asia or the Middle East, but the money ultimately works for the Russian budget. Fewer such routes mean fewer resources that Russia can direct to war.

Ukrainian companies trading with partners outside the EU face a different type of risk. If an intermediary bank is too tightly integrated into Russian payment services, it may be cut off from European operators. Then the payment of Ukrainian businesses will be suspended not because of its own violation, but because of the choice of channel. This is no longer an abstract “sanctions policy” but a direct blow to the cash flow. The choice for Ukrainian players is simple and unpleasant. Either they transfer payments in advance to institutions not related to SPFS, Mir or SBP, or they live with the understanding that at any moment their payment may stop together with the proxy bank. There is no third option left here.

How the EU and big business will change

For banks operating within the EU legal framework, history leaves no room for creative interpretations. After January 25, 2026, participation in the Central Bank of Russia’s financial messaging systems violates the sanctions regime [2][4]. Mir, SBP, and SPFS move from the status of “exotic services” to the category of connections that compliance departments should cut off first.

Big business has already seen how sanctions risk dismantles complex structures. The history of US sanctions, the failed Gunvor deal, and the fate of Lukoil Neftohim Burgas has shown that a combination of political pressure and legal restrictions can destroy even profitable projects [NS1]. In the situation with Mir and SBP, the date in the regulation is enough: banks will exit these connections ahead of time, without waiting for public scandals.

For European corporations, the issue looks tough. You can try to keep customers who ask to make payments through Russian payment services and proxy banks, or you can maintain stable access to markets where real money is settled. After the first institutions from Belarus and Kazakhstan were on the sanctions list for working through SPFS, the regulator clearly showed which solution it considers acceptable [2][6]. Those who decide to test the limits of patience will do so consciously and at their own expense.

This is not a "SWIFT alternative", it is an expensive bypass

The Kremlin’s official narrative presents SPFS, Mir, and SBP as a way to protect against dollar and euro pressure. In reality, these systems existed only as long as they had access to banks in hard currency jurisdictions. It is this connection that is the target of the new sanctions packages [1][4].

Formally, the EU simply added a few paragraphs to the basic regulation that extend the ban from one SPFS system to the entire payment infrastructure connected to the Central Bank of Russia, and fixed a deadline for the shutdown. [2][5] In essence, it is about dismantling the illusion that it is possible to simultaneously build a "parallel" payment empire and enjoy the benefits of the European financial architecture.

After January 25, 2026, everyone who stubbornly clung to Mir, SBP, or SPFS in connection with the EU found themselves in the same company — with banks and intermediaries who deliberately chose short-term earnings over a long life on the market. This is no longer a technical detail. This is the verdict of the Russian version of "sovereign payments."

Moris K for Newsky © 2026

Sources:

External

[1] Consilium — EU Council press release on the 19th package of sanctions against Russia (October 23, 2025) — 2025.

[2] Regulation (EU) 2025/2033 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures against Russia — 2025.

[3] Analytical materials of European regulators on the possibility of including third-country banks in the sanctions list for using payment systems of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation - 2025.

[4] Legal analysis of amendments to Regulation 833/2014: ban from 01/25/2026 on connection to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation systems with financial messaging function, including Mir and SBP - 2025.

[5] Comments from international law firms on transition periods for existing contracts under the 19th sanctions package — 2025.

[6] Review of the impact of the 19th package of sanctions on the financial industry: expansion of the ban on Russian payment systems and sanctions against institutions in Belarus and Kazakhstan using SPFS - 2026.

Newssky materials

[NS1] US sanctions, the collapse of the Gunvor deal and the fate of the Lukoil Neftohim Burgas refinery - 2025
https://newssky.com.ua/sankcziyi-ssha-zryv-ugody-gunvor-i-dolya-npz-lukoil-neftohim-burgas/

[NS2] How India Became a Lifeline for the Russian Economy — 2025
https://newssky.com.ua/yak-indiya-stala-ryatuvalnym-klapanom-dlya-rosijskoyi-ekonomiky/