Iran: a war of attrition scenario

Exclusive. The world is teetering on the edge of a new reality. What seemed like a local conflict yesterday is now turning into an axis of geopolitical tension capable of changing the balance of power in an entire gigantic region. Iran, which for years remained a symbol of autonomy, stubborn ideology and strategic patience, now finds itself at the epicenter of events that go far beyond its borders. Against the backdrop of explosions, closed borders and powerless cities, a fundamental question arises: how stable is the system of power itself, which keeps the state afloat in conditions of growing pressure from outside and shaky stability from within?

So, as of for June 2025 year Iran is in an active phase of open armed confrontation with Israel. Military strikes on the country's territory, in particular on strategic and nuclear facilities, have caused a wave of internal displacements and destabilization of the social environment. In parallel, economic exhaustion is deepening and tensions are growing in the information and diplomatic space - negotiations with the West have reached a dead end, and the threat of external intervention, including possible actions by the United States, is growing every day.

Despite this, the Iranian political regime continues to maintain control, relying on internal mobilization, ideological cohesion, and rigid centralization of power. In this context, it is important to pay attention to the very structure of state administration, its resource base, and functional logic - this is where we will begin.

The centralization of power in Iran is evident both in formal institutional structures and in the practical decision-making mechanism. The entire political course of the country is determined by a limited circle of individuals close to the highest spiritual and secular leadership, which effectively makes spontaneous or independent initiatives at the lower levels of the system impossible.

This concentration of power is purposeful and based on a combination of traditional legitimation (through religious authorities) and modern elements of political administration.

The vertical of governance is not only rigid, but also sophisticated: it is able to adapt to external and internal challenges without losing control. Its stability is ensured by the integration of ideological control, power structures and economic influence. Such a system does not require broad public support in the classical democratic sense, because it relies on ingrained ideas about order, discipline and national mission, forming a stable, albeit closed type of political governance.

The priority for the Iranian state machine is to maintain stability — primarily financial, but also institutional and social — as a means of guaranteeing the integrity of the system itself. All strategic decisions are subordinated to the task of maintaining the governability of the country in conditions of internal tension or external pressure. The economy is seen not only as an area of ​​development, but also as an instrument of security: control over resources, regulation of cash flows, and the ability to accumulate reserves are part of political self-defense.

At the same time, the state shows extraordinary plasticity in periods of exacerbations - it is able to mobilize hidden resources, reorient internal priorities and quickly regroup power functions. But this flexibility is not synonymous with openness or democratization; on the contrary - it is accompanied by increased control, restrictions on the information space and selective use of repressive tools. Thus, Iran demonstrates a rare type of political system: rigid on the outside, but functionally adaptive on the inside.

Iran's foreign policy orientation is characterized by flexibility and strategic multi-vectority. Despite international isolation, official Tehran has managed to form a network of external relations based not so much on formal alliances as on mutually beneficial interests - primarily in the areas of security, energy and armaments. These relations are deeply pragmatic in nature: they are often dominated by a shadowy, unofficial format of interaction, in which there are no public declarations, but there is actual assistance - military, technical, financial or diplomatic.

Iran is able to maintain partnership formats even with those states that nominally do not share its ideology or internal system, but show interest in jointly resisting geopolitical pressure from the West. Such a foreign policy is based not on a broad coalition, but on point, strategically important contacts that are activated in times of acute crises. This is its strength: Iran does not need a formal bloc structure, since it operates with instruments of flexible influence that are effective in conditions of unpredictability and hybrid interaction in the international arena.

The Iranian political system shows signs of a long-term strategic orientation, which does not count on a quick resolution of conflicts, but rather envisages a gradual, enduring confrontation. The state is aware of the depth and complexity of the challenges it faces, and is therefore preparing for a protracted phase of the conflict - with elements of military, informational, diplomatic and economic struggle.

The resource base of the ayatollah regime, despite external sanctions and international isolation, appears to be quite resilient. The state has access to the minimum necessary amount of material, energy, and human resources, which allows it not only to maintain stability at home, but also to project power outward.

In addition, the Iranian leadership possesses a wide arsenal of asymmetric tools — from proxy structures to cyber capabilities — which increases its effectiveness in conflict with an adversary operating within the framework of stricter international obligations.

The authorities are systematically preparing society for a long test: through mobilization rhetoric, information control, and cultivation of the narrative of a “fortress under siege.” This is not defense in the classical sense, but a calibrated, strategically calculated position in which Iran sees itself not as an object, but as a subject of history.

Meanwhile, in the face of aggravating external conditions, the Iranian government has managed to achieve a noticeable level of internal cohesion. Society is actively involved in an ideological framework, where the key meanings are the struggle for national dignity, the defense of independence, and the preservation of the traditional system. Citizens are not positioned as a potential opposition or a passive mass, but rather as an active resource that the regime can rely on in times of crisis.

External pressure, in particular the threat of invasion, international sanctions or diplomatic isolation, is purposefully transformed into a factor of internal unity. Calls to defend the country are accompanied by an increased emphasis on national continuity, cultural identity and spiritual mission. In conditions of such aggravation, the external challenge acquires a double meaning: as a source of tension and at the same time - as a means of legitimizing power. It is because of this that the government gains not only institutional, but also emotional support from a significant part of the population.

With a high degree of probability, it is summer - autumn 2025 Tensions in the region will enter a phase of open escalation. Military preparations, provocations, or limited strikes on infrastructure, which may be demonstrative in nature, will probably intensify. Iran at this time, according to current calculations, will be in a relatively advantageous position: the initiative, both political and operational, will be partially on its side.

This does not mean complete dominance, but Tehran will retain greater freedom of action and strategic flexibility. A large-scale invasion or direct international intervention will likely be avoided in these months—at least until external players develop a consolidated position. Barring an unexpected turning point—for example, through a sharp expansion of the international coalition or a shift in the balance of power in neighboring conflicts—the situation in 2025 will remain manageable, albeit tense.

У October–November 2025 A shift in the international context in favor of Iran's opponents is expected in 2020. Support for the latter will grow both publicly and privately - through expanded military aid, pressure in international institutions, a media campaign, etc. This may not be a turning point, but the first phase of more active intervention by external forces in the conflict around Iran.

In response to these trends, Iran will likely focus on intensifying diplomatic channels, both with traditional partners and with new centers of power. There will be increased information pressure, directed both at external audiences (to shape Iran’s image as a defending party) and at internal audiences (to maintain mobilization unity). This is a period when diplomacy and propaganda begin to work together, trying to preserve room for maneuver before a potential phase of force escalation.

У February 2026, According to the predicted dynamics, the situation around Iran is entering a phase of deep internal and external upheavals. This is a period when accumulated tensions turn into an open crisis, and the country finds itself facing a whole range of challenges. Large-scale territorial losses can be expected - we are talking not only about the possible loss of control over individual border regions, but also about the destabilization of Tehran's influence in adjacent geopolitical spaces, such as Iraq, Syria or Lebanon.

Along with this, attacks on critical infrastructure are becoming real - energy hubs, military bases, transport arteries, as well as large urban centers can become potential targets of damage, which, in turn, will provoke the effect of a systemic weakening of the state apparatus. In such conditions, the likelihood of reformatting the power environment increases: given the pressure from outside and internal overstrain, rotations in top management, the removal of individual figures, or even attempts to reboot the political structure from within seem possible. Such changes can occur both in the form of controlled administrative decisions and under the influence of external pressure or growing public discontent.

The combination of these factors creates the backdrop for the peak phase of turbulence—the moment when state authorities will be forced to act not preventively but in an emergency response mode, trying to maintain control over multiple crisis points simultaneously. This will be the phase in which the tension that has been building up over the previous months will finally turn into an open crisis with many interconnected vectors of destabilization.

The country is likely to suffer serious losses — both in the physical sense, due to strikes on infrastructure and territorial complications, and in the systemic sense, as the stability of the power vertical itself will be called into question. Critically important objects will be hit — energy centers, strategic communications, and logistics hubs, which will significantly weaken the state apparatus' ability to centrally manage in an emergency.

In parallel with this, under the influence of growing pressure, the process of internal regrouping will begin. In the higher echelons of power, a renewal of the composition, the emergence of new figures, a redistribution of powers, or even an attempt to partially reformat the political course is possible. Such a development of events will not necessarily mean the collapse of the system, but it will indicate its extreme tension. The greatest challenge for Iran will be the need to maintain control simultaneously in the political, military, informational, and social spheres, when the usual instruments of containment and control may prove insufficient.

From a strategic perspective, the conflict over Iran has the potential to become significantly more complicated. This is not only about the duration of the confrontation, but also about its possible expansion, both in terms of geography and the number of actors involved.

The deepening of the conflict implies the loss of clear boundaries between local conflict and regional confrontation. In the event of escalation, third states may be involved in the process - both in the format of direct military action and through increased support for proxy groups, blocking transport arteries, or cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.

In this case, the situation will go beyond the Iranian-Israeli or Persian-Arab-Turkic context and threaten to reformat the entire security architecture of the Middle East.

At the same time, the risk of a humanitarian crisis is growing. The burden on health care systems, population support, energy networks, and internal security may become unmanageable. The displacement of a large number of people, the lack of basic resources, and the disruption of logistics — all this creates the prerequisites for large-scale social destabilization. And even in the absence of a full-scale military invasion, the country may find itself in a state of long-term internal exhaustion, which will affect not only its political subjectivity, but also its ability to form any constructive international policy.

Despite all the ambiguity and drama of the situation, Iran today appears not only as a state resisting external pressure, but also as a complex political construct capable of sustained mobilization and adaptation. Whether this construct will stand the test of time, pressure, and internal contradictions is an open question.

In the coming months, the response to it will be shaped not only on the battlefields or in the negotiating rooms, but also at the very heart of the regime, where power meets the challenge of reality. And it is this moment, when the structure begins to sound like a note, that will determine not only the future of Iran but also the direction of the greater regional score.

Andriy Kurbskyi, analyst for Newsky.