German parts in Russian drones and missiles: GUR revealed how Moscow breaks EU sanctions

When Russian “shaheeds” enter our airspace, their electronics often use microcircuits labeled Made in Germany. Ukrainian intelligence showed Deutsche Welle journalists and partners: despite four years of sanctions, Russia has built a shadowy procurement system that feeds the war machine with tens of thousands of German transistors, pumps, and other components – and a significant part of these components is formally purchased directly on German territory.^{3 8 11} .

What the GUR found out: from "Shahed" to a list of 137 German parts

The Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine analyzed the wreckage of downed and captured Russian Shahed drones and modern cruise missiles and found a wide range of German electronic and mechanical components in them.^{8 11 12} According to the GUR, one Russian drone of the Shahed/Geran type contains from 8 to 12 transistors manufactured by the German company Infineon Technologies – these components were simply shown to Deutsche Welle journalists as physical samples by the intelligence officers.^{8 11} Given the Russian Federation's plans to produce up to 40,000 attack UAVs per year, the need for such transistors for this platform alone could reach half a million pieces each year.^{8 11} .

This is just the tip of the iceberg. On the special portal War&Sanctions, the GUR published a list of 137 types of parts marked “made in Germany” that have been found in Russian military equipment – ​​from attack drones to missiles, radars, armored vehicles and helicopters.^{7 11} About half of this list is for drones, the rest for guided munitions and guidance systems.¹¹ Most often we are talking about transistors (approximately 50 different positions), but there are also fuel pumps, inductors, generators, capacitors, transformers, batteries and other components "invisible" to the untrained eye.^{7 11} .

How Russia breaks down sanctions into details: shell companies and "gray" chains from within the EU

The classic picture of sanctions circumvention is “third countries” through which prohibited goods are supposedly transited to Russia. But a Deutsche Welle investigation involving data from the State Security Service, German investigative bodies and experts shows that after 2022 the scheme evolved.^{1 5 10} Yes, deliveries through Turkey, the UAE, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and other hubs exist, but they are no longer the main channel – the internal “gray” market in Germany itself has become much more dangerous.^{1 5} .

Sanctions lawyer Viktor Winkler explains to DW: Criminal shell companies registered in Germany are increasingly being discovered that legally purchase sensitive electronic components on the domestic market without declaring their actual final destination.⁵ In January 2026, the German customs service and the prosecutor's office announced the discovery of a network that made more than 16 deliveries of dual-use goods worth about 30 million euros to the Russian military-industrial complex in circumvention of sanctions; among those detained were citizens of Germany, Russia and Ukraine.² These components are then either redirected through third-party intermediaries in the EU, or simply smuggled to the Russian Federation, where they are "dissolved" in military production chains.

Key German brands in Russian weapons: Infineon, Bosch, TDK, Würth, Pierburg

Deutsche Welle and other media outlets working with GUR data were able to identify a number of specific German brands whose components are found en masse in Russian drones and missiles.^{1 9 11} . First of all, it is Infineon Technologies – one of the largest manufacturers of power and logic electronics in the world. Infineon transistors are fixed in various modifications of “Gerani” (Russian rebranding Shahed), including newer reactive versions, as well as in other samples of Russian equipment^{9 11} Other manufacturers identified include EPCOS AG (now TDK Electronics), Würth Elektronik, Pierburg (a subsidiary of Rheinmetall), as well as Bosch components such as pushbutton switches, fuel pumps and other components.^{9 11} .

The companies themselves, in response to journalists' inquiries, repeat the standard formula: they comply with sanctions, do not have direct contracts with Russian counterparties, and the discovered components could have reached the Russian Federation through resellers or "drainage" from civilian markets.^{1 9} Formally, this may be true, but in essence it means one thing: at the stage of export and internal control over customers, loopholes remain, wide enough for hundreds of thousands of nodes that today operate in missiles and drones flying to Kyiv, Kharkiv or Odessa to slip through.^{7 11} The fact that some German manufacturers only began to systematically check their distribution chains after media scandals indicates a delay between Berlin's political statements and a real change in market practices.

Scale estimate: hundreds of thousands of elements, tens of thousands of drones

If we add together the data from the GUR, War&Sanctions, and independent OSINT projects, a disturbing picture emerges. In Geran/Shakhedy alone, Ukrainian intelligence records 8–12 German transistors per unit, while the Russian Federation’s plans to produce up to 40 such UAVs per year^{8 11} This means a potential annual consumption of 320–480 of these components alone, not including other types of electronics and mechanics.^{8 11} Add to this the X-69 class missiles, the Iskander, and air-launched cruise missiles, where more than 100 items of foreign parts have already been found, and it becomes obvious that we are not talking about isolated “leaks”, but about a stable supply channel of a critical element base.¹² .

United24 Media analysts and specialized OSINT teams remind us that in previous years, hundreds of components from the USA, Taiwan, Japan, Switzerland, and South Korea were found in Russian missiles and drones. Under the pressure of sanctions and criminal investigations, Moscow gradually reduced its dependence on the American component base, partially replacing it with Chinese counterparts.¹¹ German transistors and assemblies remained in use due to a combination of quality, availability in the EU, and the still insufficient rigor of internal control.^{7 11} So the question today is not “are there German parts in Russian weapons?” but “why does the EU still allow them to be found there on such a scale?”

The role of special services and "agents of influence": how Moscow works in Germany

In its comments, the GUR directly states: Germany remains an area of ​​heightened interest for Russian special services.^{8 11} The aggressor uses long-standing connections, influence agencies, and shadowy lobbyists in business and political circles to organize supplies of prohibited goods to circumvent sanctions.^{8 11} . This is not only classic espionage, but also a complex game of fatigue and economic fears. Part of German business, especially small and medium-sized ones, is not ready to voluntarily give up profitable contracts when the end consumer carefully disguises himself and offers "clean" papers.

Against this background, the exposure of logistics networks reported by the German media seems less an exception than the tip of the iceberg.^{2 5} . However, for Moscow, the game is worth the candle: the ability to find loopholes in the sanctions regime allows not only to maintain the current level of drone and missile production, but also to modernize models – for example, to make the Geran-5 faster and more difficult to intercept.^{9 11} This is a direct challenge to European intelligence agencies, which are forced to simultaneously monitor Russian networks of influence, financial flows, and changes in the export nomenclature of sensitive products.

What the GUR and experts propose: how the EU can cut off oxygen to the Russian military-industrial complex

Ukrainian intelligence insists in comments to UNN and Deutsche Welle: the situation does not require another "concern", but a systematic strengthening of export control and coordination mechanisms within the EU^{8 11} First, it is necessary to reduce the number of intermediaries with access to sensitive components and bring them under stricter compliance, with mandatory KYC (know your customer), end-user analysis and regular audits.^{5 11} . Second, strengthen criminal liability for participation in sanctions circumvention schemes – so that the risks for the owners and managers of gasket companies exceed short-term profits^{2 5} Third, expand joint black and white lists of suspicious traders and logistics operators to close markets to them in multiple jurisdictions at once.

A separate direction is cooperation with Ukraine as a front-line "sensor." The GUR has already created an open database War&Sanctions, where it systematizes data on foreign components in Russian weapons and links them to specific manufacturers and suppliers.^{7 11} . For the EU, this is a ready-made tool: it is enough not only to read the reports, but also to quickly overlay this data on its own customs and tax arrays, looking for matches. Where matches are repeated, launch investigations, freeze accounts, revoke export licenses. Otherwise, sanctions will remain a set of loud declarations, while Russian UAVs will continue to carry a European elemental base.

Why is this story important for the Ukrainian reader?

For us, this topic is not about abstract transistors, but about the very concrete price of sanction “holes.” Every German chip or pump in the “Geran” is another minute of engine operation, another course correction, another blow to our city.^{7 8 11} Despite Germany's massive aid to Ukraine, the reality is that some German industry, whether consciously or negligently, still supplies parts for the weapons that Russia uses to kill Ukrainians. This realization is uncomfortable, but it is also a starting point for political pressure, new investigations, and system correction.

Ukraine's advantage is that we see Russian equipment "in the cross-section" - literally and figuratively. The State Defense Committee, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and volunteer OSINT initiatives are already doing what no European capital can do: they regularly retrieve fragments of Geraniums, Iskanders, and X-69s from our fields, roofs, and yards, showing the world what the Russian war is really made of.^{11 12} The task of journalists and society is not to accept this as an "inevitability of globalization," but to demand that partners bring the sanctions policy to its logical conclusion: to ensure that the "Made in Germany" marking is no longer found in the equipment of drones flying over our cities.

Sources

1. Deutsche Welle (Ukrainian/Russian): “Russian drones in Ukraine: how German parts ended up in them” – a basic investigation with the participation of the State Security Service and German experts.
2. Channel 5 / German law enforcement agencies: news about the exposure of a network that made over 16,000 deliveries of goods to the Russian military-industrial complex, circumventing EU sanctions.
3. ZN.ua: “How the Russian Federation circumvents sanctions and obtains German parts for drones and missiles – the GUR revealed the details” – interpretation of GUR data for the Ukrainian audience.
4. UNN (Ukrainian/English/Russian): "Russia receives German transistors for drones despite sanctions – HUR" – specific figures regarding Infineon transistors in "Shahedy/Gerany" and the needs of the Russian Federation.
5. Dialog.ua: materials with comments from sanctions lawyer Viktor Winkler on changing circumvention schemes – from third countries to gasket companies in Germany itself.
6. Ghall.com.ua / War&Sanctions: “German quality in the service of the aggressor” – a review of 137 German parts in Russian equipment and data from the GUR portal.
7. United24 Media: "German-Made Chips Power Russian Shahed Drones" - analysis on the role of German electronics in Russian drones and changes in the structure of component imports.
8. UNN / Censor.NET: news with reference to the State Security Service about the number of German transistors in the "Shaheds" and the planned production volumes of Russian UAVs.
9. Dagens.com: “German tech found in Russian Shahed drones” – a list of identified brands (Infineon, TDK, Würth, Pierburg, Bosch) in the “Geranium” series.
10. RBC-Ukraine / OSINT reports: materials on over 100 foreign parts in Russian drones and missiles, including German components.
11. The Gaze: "Ukraine's Intelligence Identifies 68 New Foreign Components in Russian Missiles and Drones" – expanding the list of foreign parts in Russian weapons.
12. War&Sanctions is an open GUR portal with a catalog of foreign parts for Russian equipment and data on suppliers.