War of singles and microblocks: every man for himself

The results of the Munich conference and the beginning of peace negotiations without the direct participation of Ukraine. What is happening and what can we expect?

In the near future, the new White House administration faces the task of obtaining a stable majority in both houses of Congress in the 2027 midterm elections. Other tasks are subordinate to this, the main one - as usual, domestic politics plays a leading role in the USA. To solve it, Trump must show voters the ability of his administration to do what the Biden administration could not do, including in foreign policy. Three priority foreign policy tasks for the USA are now visible:

- Will release maximum strength to contain China. This should reduce the risk that Beijing will decide to resort to military force to seize Taiwan;

Isolate China from Russia, as far as it is generally possible;

- To strengthen NATO, pledged the allies of the Alliance increase your contribution in general security, and at the same time strengthened the US position within NATO.

Ukraine is predictably absent from the list of priority tasks. But she is in the list of tasks of the second stage, directed to the solution of the main ones. As part of the tasks of the second round, Trump needs, while remaining at an acceptable level of costs, to achieve a truce in Ukraine on conditions that would demonstrate to Brussels and Moscow the ability of the US to significantly influence on the plans of the Kremlin. In addition, Trump wants to prove his capabilities to EU members to modify the results of the European elections. Moreover, it will not only prove, but also weaken, in some cases, the positions of European politicians who have built too close and stable ties with the Democratic Party.

As part of these tasks, Trump's team is already carrying out and will increase interference with elections in the EU countries, to provide support to parties advocating a pragmatic agreement with Putin. And in order to set the limits of pragmatic concessions at an acceptable level, Trump must convince Putin of the potential to curtail Russian ambitions. The behavior of Trump himself and his representatives at the negotiations with Ukraine and at the Munich conference completely fit into this scheme.

European countries, members of the EU and NATO, being next to aggressive Russia, with full reason for that for Putin, they are seeking a peace that is as unfavorable as possible for him. Europe needs it weakened Russia and the reason for the selective preservation of sanctions - but, and this is very important to understand, hey the collapse of the Russian Federation is not necessary on the model of the collapse of the USSR. At the same time, Europe wants to minimize its military costs and maintain maximum freedom of maneuver in relation to the US, which contradicts Trump's plans.

Both the USA and European members of NATO/members of the EU equally want to save money on support for Ukraine. But since the war is taking place in Europe, Trump is in a position to do so better positions to put pressure on Brussels than he does on Washington. At the same time, the European Union is afraid of full dependence on the United States, and sees the need to strengthen its own armies and the military industry.

But firstly, they will save anyway, shifting expenses to each other.

Secondly, such strengthening requires time.

Finally, the third, European democracy, as well as Western democracy as a whole, is experiencing a severe crisis caused by the exponentially increased possibilities of media manipulation. This fragments the positions of the EU/NATO members, some of whom are ready to make broader compromises with Putin, and some of whom would prefer to minimize such compromises, on the contrary.

Britain occupies a separate position in this schedule. It absolutely does not need the creeping absorption of the EU by Moscow, not so much by military means, but by a hybrid, corruption-economic way.

The best insurance against such a takeover can be sex cold world, with the frozen conflict, the preservation of the occupation of part of the Ukrainian territories, and the preservation on this basis of part of the sanctions that reinforce Russia's role as a raw material appendage. For greater reliability, there is a dividing line on which European peacekeepers stand.

But this architecture of the cold world does not ensure sufficient influence of the USA, and they want to tie Ukraine to themselves, concluded (probably) the agreement "investment and joint exploitation of Ukrainian deposits in exchange for weapons and economic assistance."

The idea is working, but it has a number of nuances. A significant part of the fields of interest to the USA is located in the territory occupied by Russia. Even worse is that they have already been targeted by Chinese companies, and this goes against the US plans to isolate Russia from China as much as possible. There is, however, good news - most of these fields are not so deep in the Russian rear that the dividing line cannot be moved, if there is a strong desire. It can be moved either by military means or through negotiations. And not even necessarily with the withdrawal of Russia and the transfer of these territories to Ukraine.

A tripartite, contractual version of special economic zones, which will be controlled by PMCs of American mining companies, is quite possible. Such an option is acceptable to sell to Russian and Ukrainian conditionally moderate audiences.

Finally, Putin's interests are in this scheme. Putin badly miscalculated: he counted on a blitzkrieg, but got into a multi-year conflict that has no end in sight, and which tore apart Russia, both in the military and in the economic plan, and soon it will begin to undermine in the social plan as well.

Putin now faces three tasks.

The first - regain their position as a European gas and oil column, at least partially.

The second - to strengthen the role of mediator between the West and some peripheral countries - and here Russia will inevitably enter into competition with China.

Finally, third, but in terms of importance (and complexity) it is hardly the first: relying on the "deep people", which Putin himself is a part of, and his immediate entourage, sold him the results of the disastrous war for the revived imperial greatness.

In principle, having given himself a comfortable place behind Trump, and taking advantage of American-European and American-Chinese contradictions, Putin can make a successful maneuver for himself in the US-EU-Russia triangle, solve these problems and minimize the damage from sanctions and a de facto lost war. The war is undoubtedly lost to them, regardless of Ukraine's territorial losses.

Because, firstly, Russia still needs to keep these territories in the perspective of not only Trump's term, but at least 20-30 years. It is obvious that they will continue to be subjected to attacks, both retaliatory and restraining economic activity, migration and militarization.

А Secondly, Ukraine and Poland, the Baltic countries, part of the Scandinavian states and a number of other countries will inevitably form their own "alliance within an alliance", which is known to be hostile to Russia. In such an alliance, internal to NATO, the membership or non-membership of Ukraine in NATO itself will no longer have a decisive meaning. At the same time, from the East, Putin will constantly feel the gentle breath of the creditor and controller, China, over the practically deserted and ruined Trans-Urals.

Let's be honest - Ukraine's opinion in this situation is of no interest to anyone. Nevertheless, maneuvering within all the same contradictions between the interests of the USA, Great Britain and the EU and NATO countries most negatively disposed towards Russia, Ukraine can push its interests.

The main interest of Ukraine now is a truce without recognizing the loss of territory and signing a peace treaty. In fact, this is a "quasi-Korean version" adjusted for today's European realities. Ukraine needs to hold elections, radically improve the situation with public confidence in the government, strengthen the military industry and the army, and restore the economy as a whole.

As we can see, the configuration of the future world contains many degrees of freedom. However, summarizing what has been said, it can be argued that, most likely, everything will come to a dividing line more or less coinciding with the existing front line. If necessary, it has been somewhat refined during the current year, by providing Ukraine with something special in terms of weapons, and in sufficient quantities. Tomahawks? It is quite possible. Radical strengthening of the aviation component with the involvement of Western pilots who received Ukrainian citizenship by presidential decree? Easy. And so on, here everything depends on how important will such an adjustment be for the main players, in the person of the USA and the core of the EU plus Great Britainto justify the costs.

Can such a peace be sustainable? Maybe, why not. In principle, it may well last 20-30 years, but it is difficult to predict what will happen next. Humanity is radically changing literally before our eyes. It is possible that today's territorial disputes will be completely meaningless in 20-30 years. Or, on the contrary, they will sharply worsen...

Sergey Ilchenko, deputy editor-in-chief