The EU and the US buy billions worth of energy and goods from Russia: how sanctions are not having the desired effect

Perhaps the war of the 21st century is not only about tanks, missiles, and drones. The real front today runs through the seas, gas pipelines, and thousands of containers that cling to the “Made in Russia” flag. While Ukrainians pay the price for freedom, the states that loudly promised “maximum pressure” continue to bring oil, gas, metals, and fertilizers from Moscow into their ports — and transfer billions of dollars to the Russian economy. Why does the political rhetoric of Europe and the United States often diverge from trade figures? Where is the line between geopolitics and cynical pragmatism? And will the sanctions fence break the Kremlin’s energy fuel on the path to global war?

Official statistics: shocking numbers

More than three and a half years into the war, and even at the height of sanctions, the EU and the US remain significant consumers of Russian energy and raw materials. According to Reuters and Eurostat, from the beginning of 2022 to mid-2025, the European Union imported goods from Russia worth about 297 billion euros, and the US purchased Russian products worth over 24,5 billion dollars^{1 2 3 4}Even taking into account the decline in oil and gas shares, the Kremlin will receive more from energy exports to Europe in 2025 than the EU allocates for military aid to Ukraine^{3 4}.

Against this background, in 2025, Russia expects total exports to the EU to exceed 20 billion euros only energy and raw materials; in the US this indicator was maintained at the level 2,5 billion dollars in six months of 2025^{3 4 5}.

What exactly are Europe and the US buying?

Despite increasingly strict restrictions, the following are officially and semi-legally entering the EU:

• liquefied natural gas (LNG),
• enriched uranium,
• oil (sea and land deliveries),
• nickel, aluminum, palladium,
• мінеральні добрива,
• iron, steel,
• machines and certain household appliances^{+1 2 3 4 5}.

Only for the first half of 2025 Russian LNG imports to the EU increased to 4,48 billion euros, which is 1 billion more than in 2024²The US and EU countries are also buying uranium for nuclear power plants and a number of non-scarce raw materials — even after attacks on Ukrainian energy.

How sanctions circumvention and "gray imports" work

The restrictions imposed after the start of a full-scale war are not so difficult to circumvent. Russia actively repackages raw materials, uses intermediaries in China, Turkey, India, Kazakhstan. A significant part of the oil enters the EU under the flags of third countries, and LNG is purchased through traders from Azerbaijan and the Middle East.^{3 4}In parallel, Western financial companies continue to serve retail chains — for a fee and under “exclusive” licenses.

There are known cases when ships with Russian fuel were heading to the US and EU countries, were delayed for document changes, and then headed to Western ports with new numbers. Circumventing gas and oil sanctions is not just a Russian invention, but a global shadow sector with annual turnovers in the billions.

Why aren't sanctions working as expected?

Sanctions policy has two main problems:

1. Strategic dependence on energy resources: The EU still will not be able to quickly abandon gas and uranium from Russia - the dependence is critical for industry and generation.^{2 4 5}
2. Weak control over final consumption: Third countries that do not support sanctions have become transit countries for Russian raw materials; the current G7 and European Commission framework does not apply to their trade.^{3 4}

Even new sanctions packages — like the 18th from the EU in July 2025 — only narrow the channels and lower the price level, but do not block the “life-giving” sources of Dollars and Euros to the Russian budget.^{4 5}.

Financial losses and the new balance of global energy markets

In 2025, the share of Russian oil in EU imports fell from 29% (2021) to 2% (2025), and gas from 48% to 12%⁵. But even this share in financial terms far exceeds the aid to Ukraine. From August to September 2025, EU countries bought energy resources from Russia for 2 billion euros. This allows the Russian Federation to “subsidize” its weapons programs, PMCs, industry, and maintain troops on the front line.

In response to the new sanctions, Moscow has already opened a “shadow fleet” of 200 vessels and blocked data on the export of specific types of oil.⁵

Influence on war: how billions of euros and dollars are returned to the battlefield

Every dollar or euro sent to the Kremlin for gas or peat turns into a weapon or payment for the occupier.^{2 3} Bank reports by Western analysts prove that even conditionally legal trade gives Russia a “safety cushion” for hybrid attacks, DRGs, and diplomatic blackmail.⁴ Contracts are concluded with a delay of six months to a year, so even stopping purchases today will have a financial effect for a long time to come.

This complicates pressure on Russia, maintains the status quo on the front, and encourages new schemes and "middlemen" in the energy supply chain.

How Western strategists explain their position

Official Brussels and Washington assure that every year Russia's share in the energy sector is decreasing, and by 2028 a "complete abandonment" of Russian energy sources is planned.^{2 4 5} The European Commission has already presented plans to phase out short-term contracts, and the US is increasingly switching to LNG from its domestic market and partners in Norway and Algeria.^{2 5}

However, Bild analysts emphasize: demand for specific raw materials, bureaucratic "concessions", and political inertia continue to feed the aggressor's war machine.^{3 4} Sanctions without real political will are just numbers in reports, not a deterrent mechanism.

Alternative supply channels: what next?

Over the past year (2024–2025), the share of Algeria, Qatar, Norway, and the USA in the EU portfolio has increased sharply. The share of Russian gas in total imports has gradually decreased, but for some countries (Hungary, Bulgaria), Russia remains a key supplier through the TurkStream and Balkan Stream gas pipelines.⁵

Additional taxes, price ceilings, and fines are being introduced for carriers and traders who illegally transport Russian oil or gas. But experts state that only a targeted — that is, complete — embargo and control of intermediate points will stop the financing of aggression.⁵

Forecast: Will the West succeed in changing the situation?

Reuters, Bild, and the Financial Times unanimously write: by the end of 2027, imports from Russia should come to naught, but if strategic inertia and "gray trade" remain, the Kremlin will continue to finance the military economy.^{2 3 4 5}

The "Great Divide" is inevitable - either the EU and the US actually abandon trade, or a world war becomes a question of prices, not just security.

Sources